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“ROCKETS’ RED GLARE”
 On July 7, 2016, the United States announced plans to deploy a terminal high-altitude area defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea to defend U.S. and 
allied forces better against North Korean ballistic missiles. China’s response to 
this announcement was strikingly strident. The following day a Chinese foreign 
ministry spokesperson expressed China’s “strong dissatisfaction with and firm 
opposition to the decision” and said that the deployment of THAAD will “gravely 
sabotage the strategic security interests of regional countries including China.”1 
Several articles in the China Daily over the next few weeks described THAAD as 
a “clear, present, substantive threat to China’s security interests” and compared 
THAAD’s deployment to a stark example of strategic brinkmanship, stating that 
“the negative influence of the deployment of THAAD in the [Republic of Korea] 
is similar to that of the Cuban Missile Crisis.”2 
China’s opposition to THAAD has continued 
since the first components of the system arrived in 
South Korea and became operational in the spring 
of 2017.3
Unlike the nuclear-armed ballistic missiles that 
the Soviet Union placed in Cuba in 1962, THAAD 
is a defensive weapon with limited capability and 
capacity, so it raises the question of why China 
so vocally opposes this regional ballistic-missile 
defense (BMD) system. Chinese media sources 
suggest three reasons for opposing THAAD in 
the Republic of Korea (ROK). First, they claim 
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that THAAD exceeds South Korea’s security needs and will spark an arms race 
on the Korean Peninsula� Second, they claim that THAAD’s radar will threaten 
China’s nuclear-deterrent forces, upsetting the strategic balance� Third, they fear 
that fielding an advanced BMD system in Korea will reinforce and reshape U�S� 
alliances in Northeast Asia, both by tightening the alliance with South Korea and 
by fostering a trilateral U�S�-ROK-Japan security relationship� In a July 9, 2016, 
editorial, the China Daily outlined Beijing’s argument against THAAD� “[I]t will 
not only escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but also break the strategic 
balance and widen the trust deficit among the regional powers� � � � Washington 
is trying to drive a wedge between Beijing and Seoul, and reinforce the US-Japan-
ROK military alliance�”4
How should the United States evaluate these three concerns, and what are 
the implications for U�S� policy? This article will describe the decision to deploy 
THAAD, placing it within the context of U�S� and Chinese policy toward the Kore-
an Peninsula� Next, each of China’s three concerns about THAAD will be reviewed 
to analyze the theoretical underpinnings and assess the relative significance of 
each� The analysis will find that THAAD is not likely to spark an arms race on the 
Korean Peninsula, which suggests that China’s fear of a security dilemma there is 
insincere� China’s second concern—about strategic stability and the effectiveness 
of its nuclear deterrent—appears to be more sincere, but it overestimates THAAD’s 
limited contribution to the U�S� homeland-defense BMD system� Although the 
third concern has not been discussed in the Chinese media as thoroughly, it is 
likely that THAAD’s potential to strengthen America’s bilateral alliance with South 
Korea and to advance trilateral relations among the United States, South Korea, 
and Japan worries China most� In response, the United States should ignore warn-
ings of a Korean security dilemma, address strategic stability questions, and—
most importantly—harness concerns about strengthening alliance relationships 
so as to spur China’s cooperation in denuclearizing North Korea�
THE KOREAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, BMD, AND THE  
DECISION TO DEPLOY THAAD
The United States and China are the two most significant outside powers with 
an interest in the Korean Peninsula� Both countries have a shared interest in a 
nuclear-free North Korea, but from that starting point their policy goals diverge� 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel R� Russel 
testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2014 that America desires 
“peaceful denuclearization” on the Korean Peninsula, and intends to “provide 
deterrence and defense against the threat posed by the Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea’s (DPRK’s) continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missile technology�”5 China, on the other hand, seeks denuclearization, but also 
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wants to maintain political stability in North Korea� When these two objectives 
conflict, China prefers policies that preserve the status quo over those that apply 
pressure to end North Korea’s nuclear program�6 Recognizing China’s potential 
to influence decision making in North Korea, President Trump has encouraged 
Chinese president Xi Jinping, privately and publicly, to use China’s influence over 
North Korea to curtail the latter’s nuclear weapons program�7
As Assistant Secretary Russel pointed out in his testimony, ballistic missiles 
are closely related to the threat that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions pose� North 
Korea has a large arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles and desires to arm 
some of them with nuclear warheads� These weapons may appeal to North Korea 
because they are relatively inexpensive, can strike at long ranges, and are difficult 
to defend against� In response to the ballistic-missile threat on the Korean Pen-
insula and elsewhere around the world, the United States has developed regional 
BMD systems, including THAAD, to protect deployed U�S� forces and foreign 
partners, as well as homeland-defense BMD systems to defend the continental 
United States from attack by a small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs)�8
THAAD’s deployment to South Korea came after several years of negotiations 
between Washington and Seoul, during which China consistently opposed this 
weapon system� Spurred by advances in North Korean ballistic-missile technol-
ogy, the commander of U�S� forces in Korea first proposed the idea in June 2014, 
and by October 2014 negotiations were in progress�9 During these discussions, 
South Korea hedged its position about THAAD and asserted its independent 
decision-making process� In March 2015, the spokesperson for the South Korean 
president said that the United States “had not requested to deploy THAAD, the 
two countries were not consulting about THAAD, and � � � there was no deploy-
ment decision�”10 This position was referred to as the “three noes�”
That same month, however, the South Korean ministry of defense spokesper-
son stated that “it is possible that neighboring states could have their own posi-
tions on the possible deployment of the THAAD system by the U�S� Forces Korea 
but they should not attempt to exercise influence on our defense policy�”11 China 
is a neighboring state that had attempted to influence Korea’s decision making, 
and likely was the target of this remark� In July 2014, Chinese president Xi Jinping 
asked South Korean president Park Geun-hye to reject deploying THAAD, re-
portedly saying, “South Korea, as a sovereign country, should exercise its right to 
express its opposition and the THAAD issue won’t be a problem between South 
Korea and China�”12 China reiterated its opposition to THAAD at several op-
portunities, including during visits to South Korea by senior defense and foreign 
ministry officials in 2015�13
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In February 2016, South Korea abandoned its ambiguity about deploying 
THAAD and resumed discussions with the United States� This policy change 
was triggered by North Korea’s launch of a satellite into orbit� This rocket launch 
also may have tested ICBM-related technologies�14 China continued to voice its 
opposition to THAAD� For example, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said in 
a February 25, 2016, speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
in Washington, DC, that “China’s legitimate national security interests may be 
jeopardized or threatened [by THAAD]� � � � We believe China’s legitimate secu-
rity concerns must be taken into account, and a convincing explanation must be 
provided to China�”15
On July 7, 2016, the U�S� Department of Defense announced that it had de-
cided to deploy THAAD to southeastern South Korea, “as a defensive measure 
to ensure the security of the ROK and its people, and to protect alliance military 
forces from North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile 
threats�”16 China immediately denounced this decision� The following day China’s 
foreign ministry spokesperson said, “[I]n disregard of the clear oppositions from 
relevant countries including China, the US and ROK announced their decision to 
deploy the THAAD system in the ROK� China has expressed strong dissatisfac-
tion with and firm opposition to the decision� � � � China strongly urges the US 
and the ROK to halt the process of deploying the system�”17
President Xi personally expressed China’s opposition during meetings with 
U�S� president Obama and South Korean president Park during the September 
2016 Group of Twenty summit in Hangzhou, China�18 China complemented 
its vocal opposition with actions that were tied publicly to China’s position on 
THAAD and appeared intended to coerce South Korea or the United States into 
changing their deployment plans� For example, China opposed UN statements 
critical of North Korean missile tests if they did not include language critical of 
THAAD as well�19 China also held an unusually large naval exercise—involving 
over one hundred vessels—in waters adjacent to the Korean Peninsula in Sep-
tember 2016�20 And the following month, China and Russia announced plans for 
combined missile-defense exercises�21 Of most consequence, however, has been 
China’s use of economic statecraft to reduce trade between China and South Ko-
rea, such as reducing Chinese tourism to South Korea and cutting off many South 
Korean entertainers from the Chinese market�22
The United States deployed THAAD to South Korea in the spring of 2017, 
amid domestic political upheaval there�23 The United States had planned to 
deploy THAAD in late 2017, but accelerated this in part because of increased 
perceptions of North Korea’s threat, but also perhaps because of events in South 
Korea� President Park, who supported deploying THAAD, was unseated in 
March 2017 amid a corruption scandal� The front-runner to replace her, Moon 
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Jae-in, campaigned against THAAD’s deployment� Some assert that the early de-
ployment of THAAD was meant to present Park’s successor with a fait accompli, 
thus making it more difficult to reverse the deployment�24
The deployment began on March 6, 2017, when a U�S� Air Force cargo plane 
delivered several missile launchers and other components to South Korea�25 
China’s foreign ministry quickly condemned the deployment� The next day its 
spokesperson said, “[W]e are resolutely against the deployment of THAAD� � � � 
We once again strongly urge the relevant parties to stop the deployment process, 
instead of traveling further down the wrong path�”26 Within two months, U�S� and 
South Korean forces declared the system operational�27
THAAD remained controversial even after its deployment� Days before the 
South Korean presidential election, President Trump said that the cost-sharing 
arrangement on THAAD should be renegotiated so that Seoul would pay up to 
one billion dollars more for the system�28 The original agreement called for the 
United States to pay the costs of procuring and deploying THAAD, while South 
Korea would provide land on which to base the system� After President Trump’s 
remarks, his national security advisor, Lieutenant General H� R� McMaster, is 
reported to have assured his South Korean counterpart that Washington intended 
to honor the cost-sharing agreement, but later issued a caveat that cost sharing 
might be subject to future “renegotiation�”29
Moon Jae-in was elected in March 2017, and that June he halted THAAD’s 
deployment to provide time for an environmental assessment of the deployment 
site� To expedite the deployment, the Park administration had divided the site 
into two smaller sites, which would have enabled an abbreviated assessment and 
facilitated a more rapid deployment� Moon’s decision halted the deployment 
of the remaining four missile launchers, but did not affect the status of the two 
launchers and the radar that had been deployed already and declared operation-
al�30 The New York Times described the partial delay as “an apparent concession 
to China�”31
When asked whether China viewed Moon’s decision as “a positive signal, 
as an affirmation of China’s opposition to THAAD,” China’s foreign ministry 
spokesperson, rather than agreeing or disagreeing, reiterated, “China’s position is 
clear-cut� We are firm in opposing the deployment of THAAD by the U�S� in the 
ROK�”32 A commentator in the China Daily pointed out that “it is difficult to eval-
uate the delay in the installation of THAAD after the ROK President Moon Jae-in 
ordered an environmental evaluation, because he reiterated that the THAAD 
decision made by his predecessor Park Geun-hye will be carried through�”33 It 
appeared to Chinese observers that Moon’s environmental review likely would 
slow but not reverse the deployment� This assessment soon appeared to be cor-
rect� Several weeks after Moon announced the environmental assessment, South 
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Korea’s foreign minister affirmed Seoul’s commitment to deploying THAAD 
and pointed out that the environmental study was intended to improve domestic 
political support for the deployment�34
THREE EXPLANATIONS FOR CHINA’S OPPOSITION TO THAAD
China’s opposition to THAAD is clear, but it is less apparent exactly why China 
opposes this system so strongly� Robert Jervis, a scholar at Columbia Univer-
sity, has written that “the roots of many important disputes about policies lie 
in differing perceptions�”35 To understand China’s opposition to THAAD, it is 
essential to understand China’s perception of THAAD and how it believes that 
THAAD changes the security environment on and around the Korean Penin-
sula� The following section will explain and evaluate China’s three arguments 
against THAAD: first, that THAAD will spark an arms race on the Korean Pen-
insula; second, that THAAD threatens China’s nuclear deterrent; and third, that 
THAAD could strengthen and change U�S� alliances in Northeast Asia�
THAAD Creates a Security Dilemma
China’s first argument against THAAD asserts that this weapon system is ill suit-
ed for the threats South Korea faces, but at the same time will be a destabilizing 
influence on the Korean Peninsula because it will encourage an arms race� China’s 
position resembles theoretical arguments Robert Jervis has made about the spi-
ral model of the security dilemma: that “policies aimed at security will threaten 
others�”36 Jervis outlines how, in an anarchic state of nature, a country achieves 
security only through its strength, and fears aggression from other states, includ-
ing possible but unlikely threats� In this environment, strengthening one’s own 
security will make other countries feel threatened, causing them to strengthen 
themselves in turn� Even weapons intended to be defensive could at the same 
time threaten the security of other states� Jervis writes that “when states seek the 
ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too little—too much because 
they gain the ability to carry out any aggression; too little because others, being 
menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state’s security�”37 
However, the Chinese position does not hold up to close scrutiny, partly because 
of its internal contradictions, but also because THAAD is a defensive system�
Chinese media reports argue that several aspects of THAAD make it unsuited 
for use on the Korean Peninsula� These articles contend that because THAAD is 
intended for use against “long-range” missiles it is unable to defend Seoul and 
other parts of South Korea from short-range North Korean threats, such as artil-
lery� A researcher at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military 
Science said that THAAD “mainly targets long-range missiles and has nothing 
to do with intercepting short-range ones launched by the DPRK�”38 A China 
Daily article describes THAAD as defending against missiles “at a high altitude 
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of 40–150 km [kilometers],” but then counters that this high-altitude capability 
is meaningless because “hundreds of DPRK missiles targeting South Korea will 
fly at a much lower altitude of less than 20 km�”39 Yet another article points out 
that THAAD would be useless against the artillery and short-range rockets that 
threaten Seoul� Because of these limitations, the Chinese author concludes that 
THAAD “is not a good option�”40
Despite arguing that THAAD does not add much to the defense of South 
Korea, one Chinese scholar assessed that this weapon will “stoke an arms race on 
the Korean Peninsula�”41 He Yafei, a former vice-minister of the Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, writes that THAAD will “undermine the regional strategic 
balance in East Asia� � � � When the strategic balance of a region is broken, an 
arms race follows and regional disputes and conflicts intensify�”42 More explicitly 
outlining the dynamics of an anticipated Korean Peninsula security dilemma, 
a researcher at the PLA’s National Defense University writes that THAAD “will 
inevitably make the much weaker DPRK feel a more immediate security threat 
and then motivate it to develop more conventional and even nuclear weapons to 
ensure its security� � � � The vicious circle resulting from escalated military moves 
and countermeasures will only result in escalated military tensions�”43
The language Chinese observers use to suggest that THAAD could start an 
arms race echoes Robert Jervis’s spiral model of the security dilemma, but the 
Chinese position has several flaws� Logically, how could a weapon that does not 
add much capability to the defense of South Korea, as Chinese writers argue, 
change the security balance meaningfully and create a security dilemma? Fur-
thermore, North Korea already has the world’s fourth-largest army and spends 
over one-third of its gross domestic product on its military, so whether THAAD 
is deployed is irrelevant; North Korea likely is devoting as many resources as it 
can to building and sustaining its military already�44 Yet while these two con-
tradictory arguments do not hold up in concert, they still are worth examining 
individually�
The first argument—that THAAD exceeds the defensive needs of South 
Korea—is flawed in several ways� From the U�S� and South Korean perspectives, 
THAAD adds to existing defenses, particularly as North Korea improves its mis-
sile technology� According to the director of the U�S� Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA), THAAD can “deepen, extend, and complement” other BMD systems in 
general, while on the Korean Peninsula it “contributes to a layered missile defense 
system and enhances the U�S�-ROK Alliance’s defense against North Korean mis-
sile threats�”45 While THAAD may not meet all of South Korea’s complex and 
challenging defensive needs, it complements other defenses and adds improved 
capabilities�
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Before THAAD’s deployment, U�S� and ROK forces had several BMD capabili-
ties� The Patriot missile system provides land-based endo-atmospheric point de-
fense against ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight, meaning it engages 
a threat inside the earth’s atmosphere as it descends toward a target� The Patriot’s 
operational range is estimated to be twenty to thirty-five kilometers (km) up to 
an altitude of 15–32 km�46 The U�S� Navy also can provide endo-atmospheric 
terminal defenses with its SM-6 missiles, plus exo-atmospheric defenses against 
longer-range missiles in the midcourse phase of flight using SM-3 missiles�47
Like the Patriot and SM-6, THAAD is a terminal defense system, but it has 
increased speed, altitude, and area-coverage capabilities� Its interceptor’s speed 
of Mach 8 far exceeds the Patriot’s Mach 3�48 THAAD is able to engage targets 
both within and just beyond the atmosphere, suggesting an altitude capability 
exceeding a hundred kilometers, the highest extent of the earth’s atmosphere�49 
The U�S� MDA believes that this high-altitude capability is important because a 
“high-altitude intercept mitigates effects of enemy weapons of mass destruction 
before they reach the ground�”50 This capability may be particularly important 
against North Korean missiles that could be armed with nuclear warheads� 
THAAD’s estimated operational range is two hundred kilometers, enabling it to 
defend a substantially larger area than the Patriot�51 When used in coordination 
with other BMD systems, as in South Korea, THAAD likely provides additional 
engagement opportunities� Deploying THAAD should bolster the resiliency and 
capacity of BMDs on the Korean Peninsula and increase the probability of inter-
cepting North Korean ballistic missiles successfully�
THAAD’s improved capabilities, in comparison with other U�S� and ROK 
BMD systems, also may be relevant owing to recent improvements in North Ko-
rean ballistic-missile technology� For example, Pyongyang has added a “lofted” 
trajectory to its Rodong medium-range ballistic missile� By lofting the missile—
launching it at a more elevated angle—the rocket’s reach is shorter but it gains a 
higher altitude and higher speed than a missile flying the same range along the 
most efficient trajectory� South Korea’s ministry of defense has argued that the 
speed and altitude of a lofted Rodong reduce its vulnerability to Patriot missiles, 
but it remains within THAAD’s engagement capabilities�52 The Rodong is of par-
ticular concern to the South Korean government because officials believe North 
Korea is able to arm it with a miniaturized nuclear weapon�53 It is difficult to as-
sess the technical merits of the ministry of defense’s analysis, but it is noteworthy 
that South Korean officials argue that THAAD addresses a specific defensive 
capability gap brought on by advancements in North Korean missile technology�
Chinese analysts correctly point out that THAAD does not add much capa-
bility to the defense of Seoul against short-range artillery and unguided rockets� 
But there is more to defending South Korea than simply defending Seoul; North 
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Korea likely would not limit wartime attacks to the capital city� While the city may 
be not only the political but the economic heart of South Korea, targets distant 
from Seoul also would be important to U�S� and South Korean defensive efforts� 
One example is Pusan, a busy containerport in southeastern Korea�54 Although it 
is over three hundred kilometers from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that sepa-
rates the two Koreas, Pusan is within the range of some North Korean ballistic 
missiles� The North Korean announcement of a July 2016 test launch implied that 
using ballistic missiles to attack a port, such as Pusan, is an aspect of Pyongyang’s 
war plans� “The drill was conducted � � � under the simulated conditions of mak-
ing pre-emptive strikes at ports and airfields in � � � South Korea�”55 Arguing that 
THAAD does not defend Seoul ignores other ways in which the system might 
contribute to South Korea’s defense�
The second part of China’s argument is that THAAD creates an arms race 
on the Korean Peninsula� To evaluate this concern, it is important to determine 
whether THAAD is a defensive system� Jervis proposes that if a defensive weapon 
can be distinguished from an offensive weapon, a state can increase its defensive 
armament without causing another state to feel threatened, or in other words, 
without sparking an arms race� However, it could be difficult to make this distinc-
tion, because “a weapon is either offensive or defensive according to which end of 
it you’re looking at�”56 Furthermore, weapons can be both defensive and offensive 
in character� Jervis suggests several criteria to assess whether a weapon is defen-
sive or offensive� A defensive weapon should focus on keeping an adversary from 
entering one’s territory, should not extend one’s reach into an opponent’s terri-
tory, and should be immobile� Mobile forces, even if defensive, are problematic 
because they can advance with and protect offensive forces� On the other hand, 
according to Jervis’s argument, weapons that can destroy enemy defenses or are 
more effective when used in a surprise attack are inherently offensive�57
On the basis of these criteria and THAAD’s characteristics, one can conclude 
that THAAD is not an offensive system, and is instead primarily defensive� 
First, although the Russian deputy minister of defense argued in June 2017 that 
THAAD “is not only a ballistic missile defense system, but it has dual function: it 
can launch attack missiles a long distance,” there is no evidence that THAAD has 
an offensive capability�58 The missile carries no warhead and has not been tested 
against land targets�59 With no offensive capability, it could not be used to mount 
a surprise attack� In fact, there is little surprise about THAAD’s deployment—its 
location alongside a golf course is well known, and the U�S� Department of De-
fense publicized its March 2017 arrival in South Korea�60 Second, THAAD has 
several capability limitations� It is a mobile system, as its March 2017 delivery by 
strategic airlift demonstrated; yet once it is in place political considerations may 
make it unlikely the battery will be repositioned� Its 2017 deployment to South 
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Korea was halted to conduct an environmental-impact assessment of its new 
base, which may take up to a year to complete�61 Any future relocation probably 
would be similarly constrained, except perhaps in extremis� Other capability 
limitations include that it has no antiaircraft capability and is located about three 
hundred kilometers south of the DMZ� So THAAD can target only ballistic mis-
siles, and its interceptor’s range does not extend into North Korea� By Jervis’s 
definition, THAAD is not an offensive system, and actually exhibits many char-
acteristics that would define it as a defensive weapon�
Chinese observers argue that THAAD is ill suited for use in South Korea and 
creates a security dilemma on the peninsula, but THAAD appears to be a use-
ful, defensive weapon that should not cause an arms race when viewed through 
the theoretical lens of the different impacts of offensive and defensive weapons� 
THAAD arguably is a defensive weapon that adds improved capabilities and an 
additional layer of defense for U�S� and South Korean forces� Contrary to the criti-
cism some Chinese analysts have voiced, these aspects of THAAD should reduce 
its risk of contributing to a security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula�
THAAD Upsets Strategic Stability
As Jervis writes, “[S]tates underestimate the degree to which they menace 
others�”62 Perhaps the United States underestimates the menace THAAD poses 
to China� China’s second argument against THAAD suggests that it is part of an 
American global missile-defense system that threatens China’s limited nuclear 
deterrent and leaves China vulnerable to coercion by the United States�63
This argument focuses on THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar, which has two opera-
tional modes� To provide fire-control data to a THAAD battery, it operates in a 
shorter-range “terminal” mode; to provide early-warning and cueing data to oth-
er regional or strategic BMD systems, it can operate in a longer-range “forward- 
based” mode�64 Chinese observers contend that THAAD’s radar improves the 
U�S� homeland-defense BMD system by collecting data on Chinese missile tests 
in peacetime and providing targeting information on Chinese ICBM launches 
in wartime�65 Contrary to these fears, U�S� BMD policy and weapons are not di-
rected against China� Furthermore, the AN/TPY-2 radar is not likely to change 
appreciably the information available to the United States about China’s strategic 
capabilities�
Several articles in the Chinese media best encapsulate this argument against 
THAAD and demonstrate the mistrust that exists in China about THAAD’s pur-
pose in South Korea� Building on the argument that THAAD is not needed in 
South Korea, an August 2016 China Daily article asserts that there is a “hidden 
agenda behind THAAD, an installation that barely covers Seoul but extends its 
reach into China,” and concludes that “THAAD can be used to collect radar data 
of warheads and decoys of Chinese and Russian strategic missiles by monitoring 
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   88 2/23/18   10:51 AM
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/7
 WAT T S  8 9
their tests, thus enabling the United States to neutralize their nuclear deterrence 
and put the national security of China and Russia at risk�”66 Similarly, the PLA 
Daily wrote in July 2016 that THAAD “far exceeds the defense needs of the 
United States and South Korea in the Korean Peninsula� � � � The United States 
apparently has an ulterior object in mind� � � � The real intention is to target China 
and Russia and further advance the construction of the US global missile defense 
system�”67
This fear and mistrust about THAAD are consistent with China’s broader 
concerns about how America’s BMD systems could affect China’s limited nuclear 
deterrent negatively� China’s strategic rocket force has only seventy-five to one 
hundred nuclear-armed ICBMs�68 By comparison, the U�S� nuclear force has over 
four hundred deployed ICBMs, up to 230 submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
deployed on submarines, and eighty nuclear-capable strategic bombers�69 Em-
ployment of China’s relatively small nuclear arsenal—sometimes referred to in 
Chinese writings as a “lean and effective” force—is believed to be governed by a 
“no first use” (NFU) policy�70 Pan Zhenqiang, a professor at the PLA’s National 
Defense University, explained the principles behind this policy when he wrote, 
“NFU highlights China’s philosophical belief that nuclear weapons can only be 
used to serve one purpose, that of retaliation against nuclear attack�”71 While 
there is a vigorous debate among analysts of China’s nuclear program regarding 
whether Beijing actually would adhere to its NFU policy, China’s nuclear force 
structure was developed within the constraints of this policy� As a result, China 
has only a small number of strategic nuclear weapons�72
The Chinese strategic community believes that BMD poses “the most serious 
threat to China’s nuclear deterrent�”73 While American BMD may be rudimentary 
at this point, some Chinese analysts fear that its potential to grow and improve 
over time is unlimited� This expectation fosters a fear that U�S� BMD will threaten 
China’s nuclear retaliatory capability� Sun Xiangli at the China Academy of En-
gineering Physics writes that “because China’s nuclear forces have maintained a 
limited scope for a long time, China is very sensitive to threats from strategic mis-
sile defenses� As long as strategic missile defenses develop without limit, China’s 
limited nuclear deterrent will inevitably be challenged�”74 When combined with 
the risk of a U�S� first strike against China’s small nuclear force, effective BMD 
could secure the United States from nuclear retaliation, in the eyes of some Chi-
nese analysts� Assessing U�S� motives for developing BMD systems, two Chinese 
defense experts are reported to have said, “[T]he essence of developing missile 
defense is to search for a shield against nuclear weapons� Once it succeeds, it will 
trigger a deep and widespread military revolution and even change the nature 
of politics�”75 According to this perspective, BMD could undermine strategic 
stability, meaning that it could weaken America’s perceived risk of suffering an 
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unacceptable level of damage in a nuclear exchange, thus creating opportunities 
for the United States to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to coerce China�76
How does deploying THAAD to South Korea interact with China’s fear that 
U�S� BMD makes China’s nuclear deterrent less credible? Chinese concerns stem 
from THAAD’s associated radar� Some in China argue that the AN/TPY-2 radar 
is able both to collect data on Chinese missile tests and to provide early-warning 
or cueing information to strategic BMD systems� According to the PLA Daily, 
“not only can [the radar] glean information from the region and accumulate data 
on target features in peacetime, but it can also serve as an early identification and 
tracking tool in wartime�”77 Wu Riqiang, a professor at Renmin University in Bei-
jing and a former missile designer, said, “China is not concerned with THAAD 
interceptors� China is concerned with THAAD radar�”78 He contends that a 
forward-deployed radar such as the AN/TPY-2 could provide early warning of 
an ICBM attack against the United States, thus increasing the homeland-defense 
system’s engagement opportunities� By tracking Chinese ICBMs early in their 
flight, the United States also might be able to observe the ICBM deploy decoys, 
thereby enabling defensive systems to distinguish better between decoys and 
warheads�79 This argument suggests that the radar associated with this regional 
BMD system also could make the homeland-defense BMD system more effec-
tive by increasing the depth of fire and more efficient by reducing the number of 
engagements against decoys�
The idea that a BMD capability threatens a nation’s nuclear deterrent and 
degrades strategic stability is new neither to the world nor to China� Thomas 
C� Schelling, the late eminent scholar, wrote of the Cold War strategic balance 
that “ballistic missile defenses, if installed on a large scale by the U�S� or the 
Soviet Union, might preserve or destroy stability based on whether or not they 
increased or decreased the advantage to either side of striking first�”80 These con-
sequences are particularly meaningful for a small nuclear power such as China� 
Effective BMD could make nuclear war more likely, because BMD potentially 
gives the “first striker” an advantage� The first striker may not be able to eliminate 
all its enemy’s nuclear forces, but its BMD would place at risk the smaller number 
of weapons launched in a retaliatory second strike�81 As a result, the 1972 Anti–
Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited the United States and the Soviet Union 
to protecting one location with a BMD system each, has been described as the 
“savior of small nuclear programs” like China’s, by ensuring that enemy targets 
remained vulnerable to retaliation by a smaller nuclear force�82
For at least the last decade, China’s opposition to American BMD systems 
has been consistent over different times and locations, so it is not unique to 
THAAD’s deployment in South Korea� Speaking at a conference on disarmament 
in Geneva in 2009, China’s then foreign minister Yang Jiechi said, “[T]he practice 
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of seeking absolute strategic advantage should be abandoned� Countries should 
[not] develop missile defense systems that undermine global strategic stability�”83 
More recently, China has opposed the deployment of AN/TPY-2 radars, without 
THAAD batteries, at two locations in Japan� While the United States and Japan 
linked these deployments to North Korean nuclear and missile advancements, 
the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman criticized the decision in 2013, saying 
that it would “bring about a severe negative impact on global strategic stability�”84 
China consistently has opposed U�S� BMD improvements and deployments in 
Northeast Asia�
China’s position on BMD resembles that represented in Russian and many 
Chinese reports about THAAD that include Russia as an affected party, but this 
view likely represents a convenient alignment rather than overlapping interests� 
Russia has objected both to NATO’s Aegis Ashore system in Romania and Poland 
and to THAAD in South Korea� Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov criticized 
the decision to deploy THAAD, saying that “this situation should not be used as 
a pretext for massive militarization of Northeast Asia and the deployment in the 
region of yet another positioning area for the US anti-missile defense shield�”85 
Russia’s strategic nuclear force is much larger than China’s, and therefore less vul-
nerable to low-capacity BMD systems� Moscow’s opposition may be rooted less 
in concerns about assuring mutual vulnerability than in political considerations, 
such as how BMD reinforces U�S� relationships with Moscow’s former allies in 
eastern Europe�86
From a theoretical perspective, China’s concern about American regional and 
homeland BMD capabilities degrading its nuclear deterrent is understandable, 
but in the narrower practical context of THAAD in South Korea these concerns 
are misplaced� U�S� strategic BMD capabilities are not focused on China� It is 
possible that the AN/TPY-2 radar may improve U�S� understanding of Chinese 
strategic capabilities, but no matter whether it does, the United States already has 
an array of sensors that can provide the kind of intelligence and surveillance data 
about which China is concerned�
According to U�S� defense policy, American BMD capabilities are directed 
against “rogue states” such as North Korea and Iran that have or may be devel-
oping nuclear weapons and the ability to employ them via long-range ballistic 
missiles� Furthermore, U�S� policy explains that this technology is not intended 
for use against Russia or China� The 2010 U�S� Department of Defense Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review Report included the following:
Today, only Russia and China have the capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic 
missile attack on the territory of the United States, but this is very unlikely and not 
the focus of U�S� BMD� � � � 
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� � � As the United States has stated in the past, the homeland missile defense capabili-
ties are focused on regional actors such as Iran and North Korea� While the GMD 
[ground-based midcourse defense, which uses ground-based interceptor, or GBI, 
missiles] system would be employed to defend the United States against limited mis-
sile launches from any source, it does not have the capacity to cope with large scale 
Russian or Chinese missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the strategic balance 
with those countries�87
America’s homeland-defense BMD system reflects this policy� It has forty-four 
GBIs, which constitute the only BMD weapon that can engage an ICBM�88 Presi-
dent Trump and members of Congress have advocated fielding twenty additional 
interceptors�89 Yet even such a larger future force would constitute a relatively 
small number of interceptors� Particularly in light of GBIs’ low success rate in 
testing, the homeland-defense BMD system has insufficient capacity to defend 
the United States against a large raid from either Russia or China�90
It may be difficult for the United States to address China’s concern about the AN/
TPY-2 radar� Chinese analysts mistrust assurances that the radar is intended only 
to target North Korea� The China Daily reported that South Korean president Park 
promised Chinese president Xi that the radar would operate in its shorter-range 
terminal mode rather than in forward-based mode� Wang Junsheng, a scholar at 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, wrote in response that “this is hogwash, 
for even if the first THAAD’s range were only 200 km, it can be easily upgraded�”91 
Reporting indicates that the two modes use the same hardware but different soft-
ware, suggesting it may take no longer than eight hours to change modes�92
Regardless of the uncertainty about how the radar is used and whether it is 
as capable as the Chinese believe, THAAD on the Korean Peninsula does not 
change dramatically the methods available to the United States for peacetime in-
telligence collection or wartime early warning and cueing� For gathering techni-
cal information about missile tests around the world, the U�S� Air Force manages 
an intelligence-collection program that includes advanced radars and optical 
sensors at ground sites, on planes, and on ships�93 There are many other sensors 
available to the United States, including Space Tracking and Surveillance System 
satellites; other AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan; Aegis radars on BMD-capable ships 
at sea; and the Sea-Based X-band radar (known as SBX), which is a large, missile-
tracking radar mounted on a mobile oil rig–like hull�94 So, although it may not 
be a satisfying explanation to a Chinese audience that is wary of American BMD 
capabilities, introducing one THAAD radar into South Korea does not appear to 
add much to America’s existing BMD sensor coverage in Northeast Asia�
THAAD Strengthens Northeast Asian Alliances
China also has raised concerns about THAAD’s potential influence on Northeast 
Asian alliance relationships, specifically that the missile-defense system could 
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strengthen ties between the United States and South Korea and improve the 
trilateral relationship among the United States, Japan, and South Korea� Writing 
in general terms, Thomas J� Christensen, a professor at Princeton University, 
has noted that there is a “stimulative effect of North Korean activities on U�S� 
alliances�”95 More specifically, Charles L� Glaser at George Washington Univer-
sity has written that China likely is less concerned about THAAD’s impact on 
its nuclear deterrent than about “the role that cooperation on the deployment of 
BMD systems plays in deepening U�S� military alliances with South Korea and 
Japan�”96 The China Daily also has highlighted the relationship between THAAD 
and U�S� alliances: “[T]he US is trying to tear China and ROK apart and reinforce 
the US-Japan-ROK military alliance�”97 So, how does China perceive THAAD’s 
effect on both these alliance systems?
As China has become more economically important to South Korea, ROK 
leaders have had to balance delicately their growing economic and political rela-
tionship with China with their enduring security alliance with the United States�98 
Chinese analysts directly associate THAAD with the prospects for future Sino-
Korean economic and political relations� Wang Junsheng writes that “the deploy-
ment of THAAD in the ROK will almost certainly set a ticking time bomb in the 
two peoples’ minds, as well as bilateral economic ties�”99 A China Daily editorial 
indicates that “the THAAD move will deal a blow to China-ROK ties, which are 
enjoying their best ever period since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 
1992�”100 On the other hand, South Korea and the United States have very deep 
political and security ties, dating back to America’s participation in the 1950–53 
Korean War� America remains the guarantor of South Korean security, with 
28,500 troops stationed there� In peacetime, the two countries exercise together 
routinely; in wartime, America would exercise operational control of South Ko-
rean forces, and the United States provides extended nuclear deterrence�101
In recent years, South Korea has gone to great lengths to avoid choosing 
publicly between China and the United States, and this has been particularly ap-
parent in the BMD realm� In 2015, South Korea hesitated to endorse THAAD’s 
deployment� Government representatives then responded to questions about it 
with the “three noes” and began to develop an indigenous BMD system, called 
the Korea Air and Missile Defense, as an alternative to U�S� BMD systems�102 Even 
after the 2016 deployment decision, South Korea’s defense minister Han Min-koo 
announced that THAAD “will not be related to sharing information with the U�S� 
[regional missile defense] system” and reiterated that “[s]ince the Kim Dae-jung 
administration, our nation has maintained the policy of not participating in the 
[U�S�] missile defense system�”103 His comments appeared to signal that, although 
THAAD will be in South Korea, it will not serve as a precursor to greater Korean 
integration with U�S� BMD systems�
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By hosting THAAD, South Korea chose a U�S� security initiative in the face 
of China’s fierce objections� While South Korea has emphasized that THAAD’s 
deployment does not reflect on its relationship with China, Beijing disagrees� 
Some in China have accused South Korea not only of tightening the relationship 
with the United States but simultaneously of rejecting China� An analyst at the 
PLA National Defense University wrote, “Washington wants to utilize THAAD to 
bind the ROK more tightly to the U�S� chariot�”104 Wang Junsheng described the 
deployment of THAAD as a “strategic competition issue between China and [the] 
U�S�, which is a zero-sum game,” and assessed that China will treat South Korea 
as if it “gave up [its] balanced position between China and [the] U�S�”105 Similarly, 
the China Daily wrote that “the only side that profits from the situation is the 
United States� By successfully distancing China and the ROK from each other, the 
US has secured its alliance with the ROK and the ground for continued presence 
of US military bases there�”106
Despite South Korea’s sensitivity to China’s perceptions of THAAD’s deploy-
ment, Moon Jae-in’s administration has affirmed South Korea’s commitment to 
THAAD, while simultaneously slowing the deployment to conduct an environ-
mental assessment� In June 2017 remarks in Washington, DC, South Korean 
foreign minister Kang Kyung-wha described South Korea’s position on THAAD 
and highlighted the importance of the U�S�-ROK alliance�
My government has no intention to basically reverse the commitments made in the 
spirit of the ROK-U�S� alliance� Going through the environmental-impact assess-
ment is an issue of domestic due process� It does not mean that we will cancel or 
reverse the decision to deploy THAAD� With democratic and procedural legitimacy 
obtained, we will strengthen public support for the deployment, which in turn will 
further strengthen the alliance into the future� The deployment of THAAD was an 
alliance decision, so will we, as alliance [sic], continue to collaborate on the basis of 
mutual trust�107
Although THAAD complicates South Korea’s relations with China, Seoul 
appears to view THAAD as a potentially positive element of the U�S�-ROK al-
liance� Deploying THAAD in South Korea also may increase the likelihood of 
further developing a formal or informal trilateral security relationship among 
the United States, Japan, and South Korea� Two American scholars described this 
“consequence of Chinese inaction,” regarding North Korea’s nuclear program as 
one part of a “nightmare for Chinese defense planners�”108 Throughout the Cold 
War and into the post–Cold War era, the United States has had strong bilateral 
alliances with South Korea and with Japan, but the relationship between Japan 
and South Korea has been the “important but precariously unpredictable leg” 
of the U�S�–Japan–South Korea triangle, according to Victor Cha, former direc-
tor of Asian affairs at the U�S� National Security Council�109 He described South 
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   94 2/23/18   10:51 AM
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/7
 WAT T S  9 5
Korea–Japan relations as a “quasi alliance,” a circumstance in which two countries 
are not allied with each other but are allied with a common third party, in this 
case the United States�110
Both the potential and the limitations of this quasi alliance were evident in 
June 2017� Following a North Korean test of a ballistic missile that could reach 
Alaska, the United States flew two B-1 bombers over South Korea to reassure 
U�S� allies and deter North Korea� The bombers were escorted by both South 
Korean and Japanese fighter aircraft� According to a U�S� military official, this 
“demonstrate[d] solidarity between Japan, ROK and the US to defend against 
provocative and destabilizing actions in the Pacific theater�” Although this de-
scription suggests an effective trilateral defense relationship, press reports indi-
cated that, although the fighter escorts flew in coordination with each other, each 
was conducting “separate bilateral missions” (i�e�, between the United States and 
South Korea and between the United States and Japan)�111 Thus, even at a moment 
of heightened tensions, South Korea and Japan appear to have preferred bilateral 
operations with the United States�
American policy makers advocate improving trilateral ties beyond this quasi 
alliance� American leaders in both the State and Defense Departments have 
shared a consensus that improving trilateral relations among the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea is a policy priority� In 2014, representatives from both 
departments testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United 
States desired and would benefit from closer trilateral relations� Assistant Secre-
tary of State Daniel Russel testified that “strategic cooperation among the United 
States, Japan, and the ROK is essential to developing the security order in North-
east Asia, especially given the threats facing us and our allies from North Korea 
and other regional uncertainties�”112 David F� Helvey, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for East Asia, said that “the dynamic nature of the region, and the 
growing threat from North Korea, make trilateral cooperation among the United 
States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan more important than ever� Simply put, 
trilateral security cooperation is an essential element of deterrence against North 
Korean threats� The Department of Defense encourages a healthy and open 
United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan relationship�”113
Although U�S� policy makers desire improved trilateral relations, there are 
significant historical obstacles to achieving this goal� The legacies of history— 
particularly Japan’s decades of conquest on the Korean Peninsula in the early 
twentieth century and a continuing territorial dispute—complicate efforts to 
achieve a more durable trilateral relationship� Korea was a Japanese colony from 
1910 to 1945, and Japan’s rule was particularly harsh during the Sino-Japanese 
War and World War II� Japanese soldiers forced tens of thousands of Korean 
women, euphemistically called “comfort women,” into sexual slavery� Differing 
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perceptions of whether Japan has apologized sincerely for these and other war-
time abuses impede improved South Korea–Japan relations�114 Similarly, the two 
countries disagree over who has sovereignty over an island group in the Sea of 
Japan, known as Dokdo to the South Koreans and Takeshima to the Japanese� 
South Korean president Lee Myung-bak visited these islands in 2012, eliciting 
a strong response from Japan, which faces several other territorial disputes over 
islands, such as those involving the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with China and Tai-
wan and the Northern Territories / Southern Kurils with Russia�115
Such lingering tensions have made it more difficult to achieve trilateral co-
operation, and analysts disagree about the role the United States should play in 
resolving these tensions� The impact of history on South Korea–Japan relations 
was evident in 2012 when a proposed intelligence-sharing pact between the two 
countries collapsed shortly before the signing ceremony� The agreement failed 
because of South Korean domestic opposition rooted in lingering historical 
animosity�116 Some analysts believe that the United States should play a more 
active role in encouraging Japan and South Korea to resolve these historical and 
territorial disputes�117 Others argue that “Washington cannot broker a deal on the 
complex issue of historical memory�”118 THAAD is certainly not a mechanism to 
settle these differences, but BMD cooperation could foster a more productive 
working relationship between Tokyo and Seoul�
Whether in the context of bilateral U�S�-ROK relations or trilateral U�S�-Japan-
ROK relations, China appears to be concerned about several aspects of BMD that 
could overcome history and strengthen alliance relationships� The United States 
encourages many of its allies to participate in BMD efforts� The U�S� Depart-
ment of Defense’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review highlights the importance 
of multinational BMD: “Allied and partner acquisition of interoperable ballistic 
missile defense capabilities and participation in regional deterrence and defense 
architectures will counter the coercive and operational value of adversary ballistic 
missile systems�”119 Furthermore, technical aspects of BMD encourage deliberate 
planning, information sharing, and time-sensitive decision making, all of which 
lend themselves to closer integration of multinational capabilities� The threat 
missiles move so quickly over such a long distance that the windows of oppor-
tunity to detect and engage them are small in area and short in time� Data often 
are shared among several sensors to detect and track a target; if these sensors 
belong to different countries, reliable data-sharing processes should be put in 
place� Additionally, because the threat may be within a BMD system’s engage-
ment envelope only briefly, decisions must be made quickly, perhaps according to 
preplanned, automated doctrines, which could mean that engagement authority 
is delegated to firing units� Without coordinated planning, information sharing, 
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and decision making, there is a greater risk of missed engagement opportunities 
or redundant employment of limited interceptors�
While integrating with U�S� BMD systems, a country may discover that, 
given these unique characteristics, existing defense policies do not work well, 
which can lead to significant changes in doctrine and command and control 
(C2)� Sugio Takahashi, a scholar at Japan’s National Institute for Defense Stud-
ies, has documented how BMD cooperation with the United States transformed 
Japan’s defense posture and relationship with its U�S� ally� As BMD cooperation 
increased, Japan amended its self-defense force law to allow its prime minister to 
predelegate engagement authority to the missile-defense task force� Additionally, 
the Japan Air Self-Defense Force relocated its Air Defense Force headquarters 
to the U�S� base in Yokota and built a Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination 
Center there, in part to facilitate the “seamless operational cooperation between 
the two countries’ BMD systems�”120 It is not unreasonable for Chinese analysts 
to be concerned that similar operational demands could lead South Korea to 
change its own military doctrine and C2 if it integrates more closely with U�S� 
BMD systems�
Although Seoul has assured Beijing that THAAD deployment does not mean 
South Korea is joining an American BMD network, Chinese observers remain 
concerned it could lead to changes in South Korea’s defense posture and alliance 
relationships, like those they have observed with regard to Japan� Regarding 
THAAD, the PLA Daily wrote that “South Korea cannot help but open up its 
intelligence and information to the United States and Japan in the areas of air de-
fense, early warning, and airspace control if it imports THAAD�”121 China already 
may be seeing evidence to support this argument� Overcoming both historical 
animosities and South Korean public opinion, South Korea and Japan signed a 
revised information-sharing agreement, called the General Security of Military 
Information Agreement, in November 2016� Xinhua wrote that this agreement 
would “serve the U�S� pivot-to-Asia strategy by integrating military intelligence 
programs among the three countries,” hinting at China’s fear of a strengthened 
trilateral relationship�122
Summarizing America’s interest in enhanced trilateral cooperation, the com-
mander of U�S� Pacific Command, Admiral Harry B� Harris Jr�, said, “If you look 
at Northeast Asia, we have treaties to defend Japan and treaties to defend South 
Korea� I think there’s value in a Northeast Asia trilateral [agreement], where we 
bring Japan, the United States, and South Korea together, [which] I’m working 
hard on�” Actions in the western Pacific suggest that these efforts to improve 
trilateral relations have the potential to succeed, specifically regarding BMD 
cooperation� For example, in June 2016 the U�S�, Japanese, and South Korean 
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navies held a BMD-tracking exercise, with a total of five ships from the three 
countries�123 As China appears to fear, BMD could be a mechanism for improved 
trilateral cooperation� It would be reasonable for China to assume that THAAD 
might advance this trend�
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Having considered several alternative explanations for China’s opposition to 
THAAD, we can ask: What is the relative importance of each explanation? And 
what are the ramifications for U�S� policy? First, China’s fears of a security di-
lemma on the Korean Peninsula are unfounded� Second, the United States should 
appreciate China’s concern about THAAD’s potential impact on its nuclear deter-
rent and take steps to reassure China about the limited objectives of America’s 
homeland-defense BMD program� Third, recognizing that China is particularly 
concerned about America’s Northeast Asian alliances, the United States should 
leverage THAAD and BMD cooperation with South Korea and Japan to strength-
en bilateral ties with South Korea and build up trilateral U�S�–Japan–South Korea 
relations� On the basis of this analysis, Beijing’s opposition to THAAD should not 
weigh on decision making in Washington about its employment in South Korea 
but instead should remind policy makers of the value and potential of U�S� alli-
ances in Northeast Asia�
First, China’s argument that THAAD exceeds the needs of defending the 
Korean Peninsula and could spark an arms race there is not supported well 
by facts and should not affect U�S� policy� As the North Korean missile threat 
becomes more advanced and as the pace of the country’s testing accelerates, it 
is reasonable for the United States and South Korea to bolster their defenses of 
critical forces, infrastructure, and populations� The United States may want to 
consider informing Chinese interlocutors about the tactical circumstances that 
require THAAD, but otherwise should not change its deployment posture be-
cause of this criticism�
Second, Washington should acknowledge but refute Beijing’s concern about 
BMD and THAAD’s impact on the viability of its strategic nuclear deterrent� Even 
if the United States desired to use BMD to defend against a Chinese strategic nu-
clear attack, adding an AN/TPY-2 radar to the Korean Peninsula likely does not 
change appreciably the threat information available to the U�S� homeland-defense 
BMD system� Chinese authors have criticized the United States for not making 
efforts to cooperate with China on BMD concerns; they suggest the United States 
should “restrain offensive capabilities and defensive capabilities, increase trans-
parency, and enhance bilateral dialogues” to convince China of the limited aims 
of American BMD capabilities�124 This proposal—that the United States should 
adopt unilateral arms limits—likely would not be acceptable to the United States; 
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however, more discussions of BMD capabilities and limitations may be useful as 
a confidence-building measure�
There are several approaches the United States could take to reassure China 
about THAAD’s limited impact on its nuclear deterrent� Some U�S� scholars have 
proposed reassuring China about THAAD and GBI’s focus on North Korea 
through steps such as a joint technical analysis of U�S� BMD programs, and invit-
ing Chinese observers to monitor tests of the homeland-defense BMD system�125 
Their recommendation could be extended to include observing a THAAD test� 
Steps to increase transparency would need to strike a fine balance of revealing 
enough to convince China that the AN/TPY-2 radar in South Korea does not 
threaten Beijing’s ICBMs while not revealing capabilities and limitations that 
China’s own conventional ballistic missiles then could exploit� In any case, China 
may not be interested in attempts at transparency; in 2016, the United States of-
fered to brief Chinese officials about the AN/TPY-2 radar, but China rebuffed 
these offers�126 Alternatively, the United States could emphasize to China that, by 
safeguarding South Korea and Japan from a North Korean nuclear attack, BMD 
acts as a brake on their nuclear programs�127 The development of nuclear weapons 
by South Korea and Japan might be a worse outcome for China’s security than a 
limited U�S� BMD program�
Rather than addressing China’s concern about BMD’s impact on China’s 
nuclear deterrent, others have advocated using BMD and THAAD to leverage 
this concern and encourage China to influence North Korea more effectively� 
According to this perspective, if China supports meaningful sanctions against 
North Korea, the United States will not deploy any more strategic GBIs� If South 
Korea and the United States agreed that North Korea’s nuclear program no longer 
posed a threat, the United States would withdraw THAAD from South Korea, 
and perhaps begin to reduce the number of GBIs�128 However, although there 
is coercive logic to balancing the perceived threat of THAAD and GBI with the 
assurance of future BMD disarmament pending North Korean compliance, ap-
pearing to bend to Chinese pressure on BMD might complicate U�S� efforts to 
reassure regional allies about American security commitments�129 Instead of us-
ing THAAD as a bargaining chip with China, the United States should use it as a 
catalyst for improvements in the bilateral U�S�–South Korea alliance and trilateral 
U�S�–Japan–South Korea relations�
Third, the United States should recognize the importance China places on 
THAAD’s potential influence on American alliances in Northeast Asia, and lever-
age this concern to demonstrate the tangible impact of Beijing’s lack of success 
in persuading Pyongyang to restrain its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs� 
As China seems to fear, THAAD specifically, and BMD more generally, may be 
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a mechanism to encourage more routine integration and cooperation among the 
United States, South Korea, and Japan, which may help to overcome historical 
grievances and build a more durable trilateral U�S�-ROK-Japan relationship� U�S� 
diplomacy should emphasize to Beijing that China’s inability to influence North 
Korea’s nuclear program has contributed to the perceived need for more-robust 
BMD, which could lead, as an unintended consequence, to improved bilateral 
and trilateral alliance relationships�
THAAD has seized China’s attention and received its condemnation, and likely 
will continue to do so into the future� South Korea and the United States decided 
to deploy THAAD after years of attempts by China and other members of the 
Six-Party Talks to rein in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile ambitions� 
Owing to its proximity to and political and economic relationships with North 
Korea, China has appeared to be the country with the most leverage on Pyong-
yang, but even its influence has failed to restrain Kim Jong Un� In the absence of 
efforts by China to end North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship, the United States 
and its allies must use both military and diplomatic tools to defend themselves 
and shape the security environment� It is reasonable for the United States and 
South Korea to deploy THAAD—a defensive weapon—to defend their forces 
against new and challenging North Korean threats� It will not spark an arms race 
in what already is one of the world’s most militarized areas� It does not threaten 
China’s nuclear deterrent� It—perhaps—would improve bilateral and trilateral 
U�S� alliance relationships in Northeast Asia�
The United States has deployed THAAD to South Korea despite China’s 
objections� The Trump administration should take several interrelated steps to 
maximize THAAD’s value as a policy tool, not just as a defensive weapon system� 
To address the first two Chinese criticisms about THAAD, Washington should 
emphasize the deployment’s defensive nature and allay Beijing’s concerns about 
BMD’s impact on its nuclear force� Recognizing the importance China attaches 
to THAAD’s potential influence on bilateral and trilateral alliance relationships, 
the United States also should emphasize that deploying THAAD was necessary, 
in part, because China has not used its influence successfully with North Korea 
to end the latter’s nuclear weapons program�
For this approach to be effective, however, the United States must do more 
than just employ THAAD in South Korea� The United States should emphasize 
THAAD’s potential effect on regional alliances to spur Chinese cooperation in 
ending North Korea’s nuclear threat� Alliances have been a source of American 
strength since the end of World War II and remain particularly relevant to the 
nuclear standoff with North Korea� America has five treaty allies in Asia alone, 
including South Korea and Japan, while China, for comparison, has only one 
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ally worldwide—North Korea� Improving U�S� alliance relationships with South 
Korea and Japan would send an unmistakable signal to Chinese leaders that their 
apparent inability to rein in North Korea has tangible outcomes that are contrary 
to China’s interests� THAAD has tremendous potential to reshape the dynamics 
of U�S� alliances in Northeast Asia, but only as part of what should be a concerted 
diplomatic effort to strengthen alliance relationships� THAAD could contribute 
to closer defense cooperation in Northeast Asia, but deploying a U�S� BMD sys-
tem cannot spark this evolution by itself�
The United States should not take South Korea—its democratic ally and 
THAAD’s host—for granted� THAAD is a politically significant issue there, and 
was a factor in the election of Moon Jae-in, who campaigned as a THAAD skep-
tic� The United States should work closely with President Moon to convey the 
utility and value of THAAD to the South Korean people, while also respecting 
agreements made by previous administrations about THAAD’s funding� De-
mands that Seoul renegotiate financial details of THAAD’s already-controversial 
deployment might only inflame THAAD’s South Korean opponents and under-
cut assurances of America’s commitment to its ally�
During his campaign Moon criticized the accelerated deployment of THAAD, 
but suggested that “if South Korea can have more time to process this matter 
democratically, the U�S� will gain a higher level of trust from South Koreans and, 
therefore, the alliance between the two nations will become even stronger�”130 The 
United States should have the strategic patience and diplomatic savvy to earn 
this “higher level of trust” from South Korea� Furthermore, U�S�-ROK relations 
are not limited to the military alliance� Trade, for example, is another important 
aspect of bilateral ties that should be encouraged similarly, through consistent 
policies and trusting relationships� Renegotiating financial aspects of THAAD’s 
deployment or the Korea-U�S� Free Trade Agreement, as the Trump administra-
tion has proposed, may signal that America’s commitment to South Korea is 
conditional, which would not be likely to build trust in bilateral relations�
The United States should consider THAAD as more than an end unto itself, 
seeing it instead as part of a comprehensive strategy to cultivate and bolster al-
liance relationships in Northeast Asia� China’s objections to THAAD in South 
Korea indicate that Beijing considers alliances to be a source of U�S� strength 
in Northeast Asia and fears that THAAD could bolster these alliances� Thomas 
Christensen wrote of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis that a “robust U�S� security 
presence and commitment to East Asia, in the proper context, can incentivize 
China to behave more moderately toward its neighbors�”131 Similarly, THAAD 
might enable the United States to demonstrate its continued security commit-
ment to allies in East Asia and incentivize China to urge North Korea to curb its 
nuclear ambitions� Strengthening the bilateral U�S�-ROK alliance while bolstering 
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the trilateral U�S�-ROK-Japan relationship could amplify this effect� If THAAD 
has this positive impact on U�S� alliances but Beijing remains unable to constrain 
Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, improved relationships with Seoul and Tokyo 
still would strengthen Washington’s position in future diplomatic efforts� To de-
rive these potential political benefits from THAAD’s deployment, however, U�S� 
commitments to allies in Northeast Asia should be explicit and enduring, not 
ambiguous and transactional�
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